D&O Insurance: The Tension Between Cooperating with the Insurance Company and Protecting Privileged Information from Third Party Plaintiffs by Fisher, Lindsay
D&O Insurance: The Tension Between Cooperating with
the Insurance Company and Protecting Privileged
Information from Third Party Plaintiffs
Lindsay Fisher?'
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Congress responded to
a trend of  corporate scandals
1 b y  p a s s i n g  
t h e  
S a r b a n e s
- O x l e y  
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2002, which allowed investors more access to corporate information and
significantly increased executive liability.
2 S u b s e q u n t l y ,  
m a n y  
c o r p o -
rate directors and officers became concerned that worst-case scenarios
ight jeopardize their personal assets.
3 I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
i n v e s t o r s  
c o n t i n u e
d
to be wary about misleading or dishonest corporate accounting prac-
tices.
4 Directors' & Officers' Liability (D&O) insurance, which can be de-
scribed as corporate malpractice insurance,
5 i s  d e s i g n e d  
t o  
a d d r e s s  
s o m e
of these concerns because it protects both the corporate assets of inves-
tors6 and the personal assets of directors and officers.7 Most often, D&O
t  J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2009; B.S., Mathematics and Psychology, Uni-
versity of Puget Sound, 2002. Previously, the author was an insurance broker at Marsh, Inc. and
would like to recognize her former colleagues for their experience and guidance, without which this
Comment would not have been possible. The author would also like to thank the members of the
Seattle University Law Review for all their hard work. Finally, the author dedicates this Comment to
her family for their support, understanding, and strength, especially during the past year.
I. See, e.g., Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom's Collapse: The Overview: Extra
Level of Scrutiny in WorldCom Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at Cl; Richard A. Oppel, Jr.
& Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron's Collapse: The Overview: Enron Corp. Files for Largest U.S. Claim
for  Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at Al .
2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
3. See Jeremy Kahn, Desperately Seeking Suit Protection, FORTUNE, Apr. 1, 2002, at 38 (dis-
cussing concerns that board members should have regarding scope of D&O insurance coverage after
Enron).
4. See Ben White, Enron —Related Fears Take Toll on Other Firms' Stocks, WASH. POST, Feb.
13, 2002, at E01.
5. JOHN F . OLSON ET AL., DIRECTOR &  OFFICER LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION AND
INSURANCE § 12:1 (2007) [hereinafter D&O LIABILITY].
6. Id. § 12:2.
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insurance covers derivative suits against board members and securities
litigation against the corporation and its executives!' However, because
it applies mostly to complex and volatile litigation, adjustments are often
made in order to avoid unintended results. For example, after experienc-
ing catastrophic losses in 2001 and 2002, D&O insurers narrowed cover-
age terms and drastically increased premiums? When clarifying the in-
tent of coverage, the D&O insurance community primarily focuses on
coverage terms and price.
10 H o w e v e r ,  
t h e  
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y
should also focus on the relationship between the insurer and the insured,
so it  can prevent the unintended consequence of waiving the attorney-
client privilege or the work product noctrine
When D&O insurance covers ongoing l i t i
g a t i o n ,  D i k 0  
i n s u r e r s  
o f -
ten request r require that the insureds share relevant information both
with the adjuster who monitors the claim and with the underwriter who
evaluates the insureds' risk when the D&O insurance policy is up for
renewal," For  exampledur ing the renewal process, most underwriters
request -infOrrn
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asked to provide information about potential future legal concerns that
could either increase defense costs or potentially increase the insured's--
and thus, the insurer's--liability. Underwriters may also request infor-
mation...about the defense attorney's settlement strategy or any other legal..
...theories that k e e p  ..:the insured's—and insurerl•sliability low. A n
.• -insured that fails to provide the requested information risks jeopardizing
7. D&O insurance arose on a wide basis to protect the personal assets of directors and ot.ic
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13. Under the terms of the policy, the insured is obligated so provide any material inforrnatmn
to the insurer relevant to the risk. Various repercussions are possible i f material information relating
to the litigation om i tted. Because the consequences of failing to share requested inforrnation with
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insured openly share information regarding litigation when the insurer is paying for  the defense
Costs,
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favorable coverage terms and straining the relationship with the insur-
ance company that is funding defense costs.
During discovery, the plaintiffs counsel may request the files from
the insured business or insurance company that contain information used
by the insurance company underwriters when they evaluated the insur-
ance risk. This  information often includes documents provided by the
insured to the insurer and notes taken by the underwriters. I n  making
this discovery request, the plaintiff's counsel will assert that privilege no
longer protects the information because the insured has voluntarily
waived the privilege by sharing the information with a third party.
In response, both the insured and the insurer will claim that any
privileged information is protected and that the privilege has not been
waived. The insured wants the protection because sharing summaries or
notes with the plaintiff's counsel might have devastating effects on the
outcome of litigation, possibly increasing the amount of any future set-
tlement or judgment. Similarly, the insurance company wants the protec-
tion because i f  a settlement or judgment amount increases, then the in-
surer's financial liability might also increase. Because this issue arises at
the discovery stage of the trial, the insured has the right to appeal any
order to produce documents. However, most securities litigation and
derivative suits settle out of court, and this right to appeal often has very
little effect." Once privileged information is disclosed, the damage often
cannot be repaired.
Jurisdictions should protect privileged communications that are vo-
luntarily shared between insureds and insurers. They should recognize
this protection to prevent unwanted and unintended disclosure to third
parties while continuing to encourage honest communication between
insurance companies and their insureds. To achieve this result, jurisdic-
tions need to adopt an approach that views the insurance company as the
insured's ally, rather than adversary, even when the insured is defending
a lawsuit that the insurer might later exclude from coverage.
Part II of this Comment describes how and why D&O policies dif-
fer from general liability policies, which also involve litigation concern-
ing privileged information. Because D8c0 insurance contracts are
unique, applying rules tailored towards general liability insurance con-
tracts creates unreasonable results when applied to D8L0 liability insur-
ance contracts. Part III describes the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine. Par t IV describes how privilege applies between an
insured and insurer when the insurer has failed to confirm coverage.
14. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: DctO Insurance and Securities
Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssm.corn/abstract=1101068.
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Specifically, this Part reviews the minority approach o f  encouraging
honest communication between insurance companies and insureds by
allowing privilege to extend to communication between the two. Part IV
also discusses the majority's approach of  protecting the insured from
being forced to disclose information to the insurer and the outcome of
applying the majority approach when third party plaintiffs request the
shared information. Part V describes a middle ground between the ma-
jority and minority approaches and concludes that courts should adopt an
approach that protects the insured from any forced disclosure but still
encourages open communication between the insured and insurer.
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AND SIMILARITIES OF D&O INSURANCE
POLICIES AND GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES
Because litigation involving general liability insurance occurs more
often than litigation involving D&O insurance,
15 c o u r t s  f a c i n g  
i s s u e s  
o f
first impression involving D&O insurance often turn to the approach
used in the general liability insurance context.
16 T h e  s c o p e  
o f  p r i v i l e g e
ffered to insurance compani s is most often determined by examining
the insurer's duty to defend, its covera e position, its relationship to de-
fense counsel, and the insured's duty to cooperate. This  Part describes
how these factors differ between general liability and D&O insurance.
Specifically, this Part explains, compares, and contrasts the following
characteristics under each coverage: (A) the insurer's obligation to de-
fend litigation, (B) the coverage position taken by the insurer, (C) the
process of appointing defense counsel, and (D) the insured's obligation
to cooperate.
A. The Insurer's Obligation to Defend Litigation
Typically, general liability policies provide that the insurer bears
the duty to defend the litigation." I n  contrast, D&O insurance policies
provide that the insurer merely has the duty to indemnify the insured for
defending the litigation.
18 U n d e r  
t h e  
t y p i c a l  
g e n e r
a l  
l i a b i
l i t y  
d u
t y  
t
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d
e
-
15. Michael Sean Quinn & Andrea D. Levin, Directors' and Officers Liabi l i ty Insurance:
Probable Directions in Texas Law, 20 REV. LITIG. 381, 385 (2001) (explaining that there are far
fewer cases about D&O insurance throughout the country partly because D8E0 insurance is less
comprehensive and arbitration clauses often prevent trials and published opinions).
16. See id.
17. 22 JOHN A LA N APPLEMAN &  GORDON L.  OHLSSON, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW  AND
PRACTICE § 136. 1 ( 2d ed.  2008)  [ hereinaf t er  APPLEMAN] .
18. Many Dee0 policies differentiate between the duty to advance defense costs and the duty to
reimburse defense costs to the insured at some point during or after the final disposition of litigation.
D&O LIABILITY, supra note 5, § 12:25. This Comment focuses on fact that most D840 insurers do
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fend provision, the insured submits a claim to the insurer and the in-
surer's attorney takes control o f  the defense.
I9 T h e  i n s u r e r  
a p p o i n t s
counsel, monitors the defense, and makes decisions regarding settlement
on behalf of the insured.
20 T h i s  
p r o c e s s  
c r e a t e
s  
a n  
i n t e r t
w i n e d  
r e l a
t i o n
-
ship among the insured, the insurer, and the defense attorney?'
The duty to defend under a general liability policy can create un-
wanted complications. I f  the insurer has this duty, it can be difficult to
determine whether the insurer or the insured is the ultimate client•
22 A nattorney might receive a large amount of work from the insurance com-
pany and only represent a specific insured on occasions where the insur-
ance company is paying for the defense.
23 T h i s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  
c a n  
c r e a t e
the impression that the attorney is loyal to the insurer, rather than to the
insured who the attorney is actually defending.
24 D u r i g  l i t i g a t i o n ,  
t h e
insurer might also employ the attorney t  review whether the insurer is
legally obligat d to provide coverage under the policy terms•
25 T h i s  c r e -ates a conflict of interest where the insured business might share infor-
mation with the attorney that is later used against it .
26 I n  r e s p o n s e  
t o
concerns about conflict, some jurisdictions hold that an insurer, with a
duty to defend, owes an enhanced obligation to the insured even if  it is
unclear whether coverage exists.
27 T o  f u l fi l l  
t h i s  
o b l i g a t i o n
,  
t h e  
i n s u r
e r
must thoroughly investigate the insured's claim and retain competent
defense counsel for the insured.
28 B o t h  t h e  
i n s u r e r  
a n d  
c o u n s e
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-
derstand that the counsel's only client is the insured, not the insurer•
29 Another unwanted complication arising from a duty to defend pol-
icy is that the insurer often absorbs uncovered liabilities.
30 F o r  i n s t a n c e ,a complaint may seek damages both for actions covered by the insured's
policy and for actions not covered by the policy?' Even though the in-
not have the duty to defend, rather than focusing on the specific methods of indemnifying the in-
sured.
19. See APPLEMAN, supra note 17, § 136.2[D].
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. id 136.9[C].
23. See San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984), superceded by statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 2860 (West 1988), as recognized in
Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 71 Cal. Ron 2d 882, 883 (1998).
IC  See id
25. Cf. id.
26. Cl  id.
27. See, e.g., Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 387-88, 715 1
3
. 2d  1 1 3 3
(1986).
28.M
29.M
30. APPLEMAN, supra note 17, § 136.2[D].
31. Id.
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surer might be liable only for portions o f  the ultimate settlement or
award, the insurer must cover the costs to defend each allegation of the
complaint, not just those allegations that the policy potentially covers.
32In addition, i f  the insurer declines to defend a complaint and is later de-
termined to be liable, the insurer must pay the entire amount arising out
of the complaint, even those amounts that the insurer is not liable for un-
der the policy provisions.
33 The concerns created by a duty to defend policy are mitigated when
the insurance company only has an obligation to reimburse defense costs
under a D&O policy. I f  an insurer reimburses defense costs and is not
responsible for defending the litigation itself, it can allocate defense costs
and only reimburse the insured for those portions attributable to the cov-
ered portions of the complaint.
34 I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  
i f  
t h e  
i n s u r e r  
m e r e l
y  
h a
s
the duty to reimburse defense costs and does not have direct control over
the defense, fewer conflicts exist among the insurer, the insured, and de-
fense counsel.
The duty to defend provision included in most general liability pol-
icies creates a potential conflict of interest among defense counsel, insur-
ance companies, and insureds.
35 T h e  d u t y  
t o  
d e f e n d  
a l s o  
r e q u i r
e s  
t h
e
insurer to d fend both covered and uncovered claims.
36 T h e s e  c o m p l i c a -tions are avoided under a D&O policy because the insurer only pays de-
fense costs attributable to allegations covered under the insurance, and it
is not responsible for costs associated with defending the entire com-
plaint.
37
B. The Coverage Position Taken by the Insurer
Under duty to defend provisions of general liability insurance, the
insurance company has three primary approaches to determine whether
or not a claim is covered under the insured's policy.
38 F i r s t ,  t h e  
i n s u r -
ance company can deny the c laim.
39 S e c o n d ,  
t h e  
i n s u r a n c e  
c o m p a n
y  
c a n
accept the c laim.
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complaint, but simultaneously issue a reservation of rights letter to the
32. Trizec Prop., Inc. v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 767 F.2d 810, 811 (11th Cir. 1985).
33. APPLEMAN, supra note 17, § 136.8[B][1 J.
34. D&O LIABILITY, supra note 5, § 12:26.
35. APPLEMAN, supra note 17, § 136.9[C][2].
36. id § 136.2[D].
37. D&O LIABILITY, supra note 5, § 12:26.
38. APPLEMAN, supra note 17, § 136.7[A].
39.1d
40. Id
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cally takes only the third approach of issuing a reservation of rights.
A reservation of rights letter informs the insured that the insurance
company is going to begin defending the claim but will reserve its rights
under the policy to cease defending and seek reimbursement later.
42 T h einsurer will stop defending and seek reimbursement if  facts show that a
complaint is either precluded or excluded from coverage.
43 F o r  e x a m p l e ,if  a jury determines that the general liability insured intentionally, rather
than unintentionally, caused bodily injury, the general liability insurer
might seek reimbursement under its previously issued reservation o f
rights.'" General liability insurers do not issue reservation of rights let-
ters on a regular basis because the majority of claims submitted include
allegations of negligence that are covered under the policy.
Unlike general liability insurers, most D&O insurers typically issue
reservation of rights letters.
45 D & O  
i n s u r e r s  
r e l y  
o n  
r e s e r v
a t i o n  
o f  
r i g
h t s
letters because coverage for submitted claims often depends on the plain-
tiff alleging c rtain allegations.
46 F o r  
e x a m p l e ,  
a l l  
D & O  
i n s u r a n
c e  
p o l i
-
cies contain personal conduct exclusions,
47 s u c h  a s  
e x c l u s i o n s  
f o r  
l o s s
arising out of fraudulent wrongful acts." An insured is not likely to ad-
mit fraud willingly and jeopardize insurance coverage at the onset of liti-
gation. Therefore, the question of whether the insured committed a fraud
will probably be answered during trial or after a settlement is reached.
Because fraud allegations are common in D&O claims, a D&O insurer
cannot be confident about coverage until the litigation has developed.
49To avoid bad faith claims, most D&O insurers agree to indemnify de-
fense costs while the litigation is developing, but usually reserve their
right to deny coverage later down the road.
5c1
41. M § 136.7[13][1].
42. M
43. M
44. See id
45. INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE, supra note 8, * III.
46. M
47. D&O LIABILITY, supra note 5, 12:12.
48. Id Although most D&O policies contain a fraud exclusion, policies vary on the scope of
the exclusion. Some policies provide that the exclusion will only apply when fraud has been proven
"in fact," while others provide that coverage will be excluded only after fraud has been proven by a
final adjudication. I t  logically follows that under the final adjudication approach, coverage cannot
be fully determined until a final judgment has been provided i f allegations of fraud are at issue.
49. For instance, classic securities claims alleging misrepresentation made up more than 97%
of the securities class actions filed in 2005, 2006, and 2007. See Stanford Law School Securities
Class Acti on Clearinghouse, Securities Class Ac ti on Li tigation b y  Type o f  Lawsuit,
http://securitiesstanford.edui (last visited July 3, 2008).
50. D&O LIABILITY, supra note 5, §12:24.
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C. The Process of Appointing Defense Counsel
Many insured businesses become concerned that a conflict of inter-
est exists when a general liability insurer has the duty to defend but has
also reserved its right to later deny coverage.
51 U n d e r  t h e  
d u t y  t o  
d e f e n d
provisio s of a general liability policy, the insurer is responsible for ap-
pointing counsel and defending the claim. The appointed counsel might
consider both the insurance company and the insured as clients. The ap-
pointed counsel might also be inclined to hold the insurance company's
interests above the insured's interests.
52 M o s t  o f t e n ,  
a n  
i n s u r a n c e  
c o m -
pany select  counsel with which it has prior experience. I n  turn, the de-
fense counsel is often very loyal to the insurance company because it
provides most of the defense counsel's business.
In the past, it was not uncommon for an insurer to employ the same
counsel to represent both the insured and the insurance company when
there was a coverage dispute with the insured.
53 T h i s  m a d e  
s e n s e  
b e -
cause the counsel was often th  most familiar with the details of the liti-
gation and wa  in the best position to argue the facts.
54 B c a u s e  o f  
t h i s
trend, insureds and courts became concerned that, although the counsel
was representing the insured in litigation, the focus of the counsel was to
determine coverage for the insurer.
55 Most jurisdictions solve this conflict by permitting the insured to
appoint independent counsel, at the expense of the insurer, when the in-
surer has issued a reservation of rights letter.
56 T h i s  c o u n s e l  
i s  
r e f e r r e d
to as Cumis counsel, after the leading case establishing the insurer's ob-
ligation to pay for independent counse1.
57 I n  C u m i s ,  
t h e  
c o u r t  
a c k n o w l -
edged that "Nil actions in which t h e  insurer and insured have con-
flicting int rests, the insurer may not compel the insured to surrender
contr l of the litigation."
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cal care expressed in the ABA Code of Ethics that outline requirements
for undiluted loyalty to clients.
59 T h e  c o u r t  
f o u n d  
t h a t  
t h e  
i n s u r
e r  
s t i l
l
51. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984).
52. Id
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57  San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 506 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984).
58. Id at 501 (quoting Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 648 (1964)).
59. Id at 499-500 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 ("The profes-
sional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the new law, solely for the
benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal inter-
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must pay for these defenses when the insured has appointed independent
counsel because the insurer had the duty to pay for the defense under the
duty to defend.
6° Unlike a general liability insurance policy, an insured under a D&O
policy has the responsibility of selecting and appointing counsel from the
onset of the c laim.
61 
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that the i sur r will advance defense costs, either as the costs are in-
curre  or on an interim basis, rather than at the conclusion of the litiga-
tion.
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terest to advance defense costs because if  an insured could not afford a
competent defense, then the insurance company's ultimate liability might
increase."
Appointing Cumis counsel under a general liability policy and ap-
pointing counsel under a D&O policy are similar. I n  each instance, the
insured, not the insurer, has the direct relationship with counsel.
D. The Insured's Obligation to Cooperate
Most liability insurance policies, including D&O and general liabil-
ity insurance policies, have a "cooperation clause."
65 T h i s  c l a u s e  
r e -
quires the in ured to fully cooperate with the insurer in the event of a
c laim.
66 
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s
:
The Insurer shall have the right to effectively associate with each
and every [insured] in the defense and prosecution of any Claim that
involves, or appears reasonably likely to involve, the Insurer, in-
cluding, but not limited to, negotiating a settlement. Each and every
[insured] shall give the Insurer full cooperation and such informa-
tion as it may reasonably require.
°
sts, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his
loyalty to his client.")).
60. M at 501.
61. D&O LIABILITY, supra note 5, § 12:24.
62. Id. I n  determining whether to approve counsel, the D&O insurer considers whether possi-
ble conflicts exist between that counsel and other insureds, whether duplication of representation
exists, the counsel's expertise in handling such claims, and the policies and procedures the counsel
has in place to monitor and allocate costs.
63. M § 12:25.
64. Id.
65. COUCH, supra note 56, § 199:3.
66. M § 199:4.
67. Am. Int' l  Group, Pub. Co. Specimen Dir. &  Officers Ins. Policy Form No. 2/2000,
http://www.aig.com/Public-Company-Directors-and-Officers-Insurance-Dand0-22000_20_1721
.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
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Cooperation clauses not only help ensure that the insured is cooper-
ating with the insurer in good faith but also help prevent fraud and collu-
sion between the insured and a third party claimant.
68 I n s u r a n c e  
c o m p a -
nies require insureds' cooperation to monitor defense costs and settle-
ment amounts because the companies usually have a financial interest in
the outcome.
69 
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with the insurance company because, for instance, the insurer has seen
many different D&O claims and can share insight and experience with
the insured and the insured's counse1.
7() I f  the insurer can show that the insured has not cooperated, then the
insured's coverage will be in jeopardy.
71 N o n - c o o p e r a t i o n  
w i t h  
t h e  
i n -
surance company can also slow the reimbursement of costs of a c laim.
72Although many businesses can absorb these costs on a short-term basis,
individual directors and individual officers are often unable or unwilling
to absorb steep defense costs, even on a short-term basis." Therefore,
the insured often has a pragmatic incentive to maintain a working rela-
tionship and fully cooperate with the insurer.
BASIC POLICIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
Because they must cooperate with their D&O insurance company,
insureds often question the potential ramifications of  sharing informa-
tion. This Part reviews (A) privileges and voluntary waiver of privileges
and (B) exceptions to voluntary waiver principles.
A. Privileges and Voluntary Waiver of Privileges
The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protect par-
ties from having to disclose certain information to outside parties.
74First, the attorney-client privilege protects communications between at-
t rneys and their clients in the course of obtaining or rendering legal ad-
vice.
75 
T
o  
b
e  
p r
o t
e
c t
e
d ,  
t
h
i
s  
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n  
m
u
s
t  
b
e  
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
e
d  
i
n  
c
o
n
-
68.14 COUCH, supra note 56, § 199:4.
69. D&O LIABILITY, supra note 5, § 12:24.
70. Id.
71. Yale v. Nat' l Indent. Co., 664 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1981).
72. See D&O LIABILITY, supra note 5, § 12:24 (discussing the importance of a dialogue be-
tween the insurer and insured in the beginning of the litigation in order to establish a defense strat-
egy).
73. Cl id § 12:25.
74. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 3 (5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE].
75. Id. Attorneys also have an ethical obligation to protect information communicated confi-
dentially with clients. MODEL CODE OF PRoE'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B).
2008] D & O  Insurance 2 1 1
fidence, between privileged persons, and for the purpose of obtaining or
rendering legal assistance.
76 S e c o n d ,  
t h e  
w o r k  
p r o d u
c t  
d o c t r
i n e  
p r o t
e c t s
certain materials that are prepared by or for an attorney in anticipation of
litigation." Materials protected by the work product doctrine include an
attomey's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theo-
ries.
78 Courts protect the work product privilege more than they protect
the attorney-client privilege because the work product privilege rein-
forces the adversarial nature of the legal system." I n  contrast, courts
will only recognize the attorney-client privilege if the party asserting the
privilege has taken some "affirmative action to preserve confidential-
ity ."
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information is voluntarily disclosed to a non-privileged party while the
work product privilege is waived only i f  information is voluntarily dis-
closed to an adversarial party.
81 A  n o n -
p r i v i l e g e d  
p a r t y  
i s  
b r o a d
e r  
t h a
n
an adversarial party because it includes any party that is not the client,
the client's attorn y, or certain agents of either the client or the attor-
ney.82
The attorney-client and work product privileges can be unintention-
ally walved
83 
t h r o u
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a
non-privileged or adversarial party waives not only the privilege of that
particular communication but possibly also the privilege of all communi-
cations regarding the same subject.
85
B. Exceptions to Voluntary Waiver Principles
In certain situations, interested parties might want to share privi-
leged information with an outsider without waiving the attorney-client
privilege or the work product privilege. Two doctrines that can protect
privileged information from voluntary waiver are the joint-defense doc-
trine and the common interest doctrine.
86
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2008).
77. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,238 n.11 (1975).
78. M
79. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of  Phil., 951 F.2d 1414,1428-29 (3d Cir. 1991)
("Protecting attorneys' work product promotes the adversary system by enabling attorneys to prepare
cases without fear that their work product will be used against their clients.").
80. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72,82 (2d Cir. 1973).
81. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1428-29.
82. See PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE, supra note 74, at 134.
83. See Powers v. Chi. Transit Auth., 890 F.2d 1355,1359 (7th Cir. 1989).
84. See 2 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. § 9:23 (2d ed. 2008).
85. See id. § 9:80.
86. DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES §§ I :78—:79 (3d ed. 2008) (here-
inafter TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES].
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The joint-defense doctrine is an exception to voluntary waiver of
the attorney-client or work product privileges." This  doctrine applies
when the same counsel represents parties in the same litigation.
88 T h eRestatement of the Law Governing Lawyers describes the joint-defense
doctrine exception as occurring when "two or more persons are jointly
represented by the same lawyer in a matter, [in which case] a communi-
cation of either co-client i s  privileged as against third persons."
89 From the joint-defense doctrine grew the common interest doc-
trine." T he common interest doctrine applies when separate counsel
represents parties with a common interest.
91 T h e  
R e s t a t e m e n t  
o f  
t h e  
L a w
Governing Lawyers describes the common interest exception as occur-
ring "[i]f two or more clie ts with a common interest in litigated or non-
litigated matter are represented by separate lawyers [ i n  which case a
communication of  either client] that relates to the common interest is
privileged as against third persons."
92 To claim the common interest exception, some courts require that
the common goal or interest be a legal one, not merely a business one.
93Some jurisdictions, however, have held that a mere financial interest is
sufficient." This  approach recognizes that many parties seek out legal
counsel when substantial financial amounts are at risk. I f  sharing infor-
mation waives the associated privileges, parties will hesitate to engage in
a transparent exchange of information and, thus, may not obtain effective
legal advice. I n  addition, even though parties such as insurance compa-
nies and creditors do not have a per se legal interest in the outcome of
litigation, they have a significant financial one.
87. Haines v. Ligget Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81,94 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the joint-defense
doctrine permits counsel for  clients facing a common litigation opponent to exchange privileged
communications and attorney work product in order to adequately prepare a defense without waiving
either privilege.).
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2008).
89. Id
90. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, supra note 86, § 1:80 (discussing courts' willingness to "expand
the rationale of the joint-defense doctrine to include situations in which the clients are pursuing a
common interest but do not share the same attorney").
91. Id.
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §76 (2008).
93. Go Med. Indus. Pty., Ltd. v. C. R. Bard, Inc., No. 3:95 MC 522,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22919, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 14,1998) ("An insurer's contractual obligation to pay its insured's
litigation expenses does not, by itself, create a common interest between the insurer and the insured
that is sufficient to warrant application of the common interest rule of the attorney client privilege.");
In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 1260,1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18215, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 22,1993) (concluding that documents shared with insurer in order to negotiate claims coverage
were not about a legal matter and waived the attorney-client privilege).
94. CI Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Intl  Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322,328 (III. 1991) (find-
ing that a common interest existed between the insurance company and insured because the insur-
ance company had a financial interest in the ultimate outcome of the litigation).
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Some courts have also held that a common interest does not exist
when parties are adversaries.
95 T h i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o
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m e a n s  
t h a t  
t h e  
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k -
product privilege is waived when privileged information is shared with
an adv rsarial party.
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adversarial interests with respect to a specific issue, then their entire rela-
tionship might also be considered adversarial. I f  so, the common interest
exception will fail to protect work product regarding a different, non-
adversarial matter.
Parties use exceptions to voluntary waiver of privilege in two ways.
The first way is to use the doctrine as a sword, by forcing information
exchange between parties that are members o f  the common interest
group or parties that share the same counse1.
97 T h e  s e c o n d  
w a y  i s  
t o  
u s e
the information as a shield, by protecting the information from third par-
ties th t are not members of the common interest group or co-parties in
litigation.
98 The common interest exception is used as a sword when an insured
and insurer engage in coverage litigation.
99 I n  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n ,  
t h e  
i n s u r e r
argues that the insured must disclose privileged information to the in-
surer becaus  the insurer and the insured have a common interest in de-
fending the s uit .
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insurer is still potentially liable under the policy and arguably has a
shared interest with the insured to minimize defense and settlement
costs.
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common interest with the insured because the insurer is seeking to deny
the c la in t
m The common interest is used as a shield to protect information that
an insured shares with an insurer.
1133 I n  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n ,  
a  
t h i r d  
p a r t y  
p l a i n
-
tiff argues that the insured has voluntarily waived privileged information
because the insured shared the information with the insurer, a non-
privileged party .
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interest exception shields the information, and that the privilege still ap-
plies because the insurer and insured have a common interest to defeat
95. United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 553 (10th Cir. 1985).
96. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1428-29 (3d Cit. 1991).
97. James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement:
Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for  Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 637
(1997).
98.1d.
99. Id
100. M
101. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Inel Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 329 (Ill. 1991).
102. Fischer, supra note 97, at 638.
103. M
104. See id.
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the litigation.
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ity insurance, the insurer and the insured will also argue that the joint-
defense doctrine shields the information because the insured and insurer
share attorneys.
106 I f  the court finds that the common interest serves as a sword, it will
also probably find that the common interest serves as a shield against
other third parties. T o serve as a sword, the court must find that the in-
surer and the insured share a common interest and can, or even should,
freely exchange information. When the insured and insurer share a
common interest, sharing privileged information does not voluntarily
waive the privilege with respect to third parties. Therefore, the common
interest is available to serve as a shield. However, the opposite also ap-
plies. I f  the court finds that a common interest does not exist and the
insured is not required to share information with the insurer, the court
will also probably find that a common interest does not exist to provide a
shield against third party plaintiffs. I f  the insured is not required to share
i formation with the insurer, voluntarily doing so will waive the privi-
lege.
Privileged information voluntarily shared with a D&O insurance
company will continue to be protected if  the court finds that the D8L0
insurer and the insured have a common interest in the litigation. There-
fore, it is necessary to review whether jurisdictions are willing to apply a
broad definition of common interest when an insurer is obligated to re-
imburse defense costs but does not have a legal responsibility to provide
or hire defense counsel.
IV. THE "COMMON INTEREST" BETWEEN AN INSURED AND INSURER
WHEN THE INSURER IS NOT DIRECTLY DEFENDING THE LITIGATION
If an insurance company controls the defense of a claim on a duty
to defend basis under general liability insurance, the joint-defense doc-
trine can protect privileged information voluntarily shared between the
insurer and the insured.
107 I f  a n  
i n s u r a n c
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n y  
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d
e -
fense costs, as it would under D&O insurance, the joint-defense doctrine
will not apply because the insured and the insurer do not share the same
counsel. Some jurisdictions might protect privileged information by ap-
plying the common interest doctrine, but many jurisdictions will not.
This inconsistency results from courts differing as to whether a common
interest exists between the insurer and insured when the two parties share
105. See id
106. Id. at 640.
107. The joint-defense doctrine applies when an insurer has a duty to defend because the in-
surer and the insured are sharing the same counsel.
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only a financial interest in the litigation, rather than a direct legal interest
in the defense.
m8 Most frequently, courts are asked whether a common interest exists
when a general liability  insurer is demanding privileged information
from the insured that relates to a disputed coverage issue.
1139 J u r i s d i c t i o n sanswering this question are split. The minority holds that a common in-
terest does exist and that the insured must share privileged information
relating to potentially covered claims with its insurer.' lc
' I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h emajority holds that  common interest does not exist and the insured is
not required to share privileged information with its insurer, even if  the
insurance company might have financial responsibly for the outcome of
the c laim."
One jurisdiction has applied the majority approach to the issue pre-
sented in this article: whether information voluntarily shared by an in-
sured with its D8L0 insurer remains privileged against third parties. The
court held that the information does not remain privileged because a
common interest does not exist between a D&O insurer and its in-
sured.
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third party plaintiff despite protests from both the insured and the D&O
insurance company.
II3 The remainder of this Part describes the reasoning behind (A) the
minority approach of finding a common interest and (B) the majority
approach of finding no common interest between an insured and an in-
surer that is reimbursing defense costs under either a general liability or a
D840 insurance policy.
A. The Minority Approach Holds that a Common Interest
Always Exists Between an Insured and Insurer
In the leading case in support o f  the minority approach, Waste
Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., the I lli-
nois Supreme Court found that the cooperation clause in the insurance
108. See Fischer, supra note 97, at 653-54.
109. See id. at 637.
110. EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 18, 24 (D. Conn. 1992); Metro Wastewater
Reclamation Dist. v. Conel Cas. Co., 142 F.R.D. 471, 476 (D. Colo. 1992); Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gui-
dant Corp., 869 N.E.2d 1042, 1053 (III. App. Ct. 2007) (upholding Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Intl  Sur-
plus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322 (III. 1991)).
111. Rockwell Int l  Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Tonka Corp., 140 F.R.D. 381, 386 (D. Minn. 1992); Remington
Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 R i t a  408, 416-17 (D. Del. 1992); N. River Ins. v. Phila.
Reinsurance, 797 F. Supp. 363, 369 (D.N.I. 1992)).
112. Imperial Corp. of Am. v. Shields, 167 F.R.D. 447,453 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
113./d.
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policy created a common interest between the insurer and the insured."
4Because the court found that a common interest existed, it required the
insured to share privileged information with the insurer."
5 T h e  p l a i n t i f f sin Waste Management were insurance companies that had sold Waste
Management multiple environmental liability insurance polic ies.
116 U n -der the provisions of the policies, the insurers had the duty to reimburse
Waste Management but did not have the duty to defend.
117 I n  a d d i t i o n ,the policies contained a standard cooperation clause requiring Waste
Management to "give all such information and assistance as the insurers
may reasonably require" in the event of a Clairn.
118 When Waste Management initially submitted its claim to the insur-
ers, the insurers reserved their right to later deny coverage.
119 I n  a d d i t i o nto the initial reported claim, the insured was also involved in related liti-
gation that was not covered under the policy.120 The insurance compa-
nies denied coverage when the insured requested reimbursement due in
part to Waste Management's failure to disclose the additional litiga-
t ion.
121 
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Waste Management produce privileged files in connection with both the
submitted claim and the unreported litigation.
122 T h e  c i r c u i t  
c o u r t  
c o m -
pelled Waste Management to produce the documentation.
I23 W a s t eManagement app aled to the Illinois Supreme Court seeking to overturn
the lower court's order.
124 In this case, the insurers used the common interest doctrine as a
sword by arguing that Waste Management should be compelled to share
privileged information with the insurer because a common interest ex-
is ted.
125 
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ance company did not participate in the defense and, therefore, did not
have a common interest.
126 T h e  
c o u r t  
u l t i m a t e
l y  
c o m p e
l l e d  
W a s
t e  
M a
n -
agement to share the information because (1) Waste Management could
not have expected to keep information confidential after accepting the
114.579 N.E.2d 322,328-30 (111.1991).
115.1d. at 331-32.
116. Id at 324-25.
117. Id at 325.
118. Id at 327-28.
119. Id at 325. Although the court did not call the insurer's response a "reservation of rights,"
the court did accept that the insurer was not accepting or denying coverage at that time.
120. Id
121. Id
122. M
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id at 328.
126. Id
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cooperation clause in the insurance policy and (2) Waste Management
had a common interest with the insurance company.
127 First, the court held that the element of confidentiality to establish
the attorney-client privilege was missing.128 Specifically, after Waste
Management accepted the cooperation clause, it could no longer expect
to have a choice in whether or not it disclosed information to the insurers
about a claim in which the insurers had an ultimate duty to pay .
129 W i t h -out the element of confidentiality, Waste Management failed to establish
the attorney-client privilege.
Second, the court held that the insured and the insurer had a com-
mon interest, and therefore, the attorney-client privilege and work prod-
uct doctrine did not protect the information from being shared with the
insurer:
30 
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mon interest in cases where the insurer has participated in the defense.
131However, the court held that a common interest existed between Waste
Management and insurers even though the insurers did not participate in
the defense and did not have a duty to defend.
132 T o  a c h i e v e  
t h i s  o u t -
come, the court concluded that a common interest existed when the in-
surer might be ultimately liable for payment to the insured.
133 T h e  c o u r twas further motivated by the possibility that denying discovery "would
be to disregard considerations of  public policy which require encour-
agement of full disclosure by an insured to his insurer."
134 A l t h o u g hWaste Management argued that the work product doctrine applied be-
cause the insurer was an adverse party, the court found that the informa-
tion was produced for the common interest of both parties before they
became adversaria1.
135 In its conclusion, the court clarified that privilege was waived only
with respect to the insurance company and was not waived with respect
to other third parties:
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held the insured had a common interest with the insurer. By  sharing in-
formation with the insurer, the insured would not waive its privilege in a
traditional sense. Under this reasoning, information subject to a common
127. M at 328-30.
128. Id at 328.
129. Id.
130. M at 329.
131.
61 
a t  
3
2
8 .
132.
61133. Id at 329.
134. Id
135. Id at 332.
136. Id
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interest would likely be protected from a discovery request made by a
third party plaintiff.
137 Adopting the minority position, the court in Waste Management
held that when an insurer is reimbursing defense costs and has reserved
its right to later deny coverage, a common interest still exists between the
insured and the insurer.
I38 B e c a u s e  
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-
ation, sharing information between an insured and an insurer does not
waive any associated privilege and the information is still protected from
other non-privileged and adversarial parties.
B. The Majority Approach Holds that a Common Interest Never Exists
Between an Insured and Insurer that is Not Directly Defending the Claim
A number of other courts have taken the opportunity to review the
Waste Management decision and most have declined to follow it.
' 3 9  T h emajority o f  courts that oppose the Waste Management decision ada-
mantly rejected the conclusion that a cooperation clause waives confi-
dentiality and also rejected the conclusion that a common interest inher-
ently exists between insurers and insureds.
1413 O n e  f e d e r a l  
c o u r t  
w e n t  
s o
far as to describe the r asoning in Waste Management as "fundamentally
Unsound."The majority approach of finding no common interest is most clear-
ly established in the context of an insurer attempting to use the common
interest as sword by demanding information from an insured during cov-
erage litigation.
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the majority approach in the context of a third party plaintiff demanding
information that the insured shared with its D8L0 insurer.
143
1. The Majority Approach: When a General Liability Insurer Demands
Privileged Information from the Insured
Rockwell International Corp. v. Superior Court is the leading case
that rejects the Waste Management approach in the context of an insured
137. However, this approach does leave the door open to consider i f the attorney-client privi-
lege exists at all because the court finds that the cooperation clause in the policy establishes an ex-
pectation that confidentiality will not be maintained. W i thout the confidentiality element estab-
lished, it is possible that a third party plaintiff would argue that the attorney-client privilege does not
protect the information in the first place.
138. Waste Mgnu., 579 Isl.E.2d at 328.
139. See cases cited supra note 111.
140. Rockwell 1nel Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
141. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Tonka Corp., 140 R i t a  381, 386 (D. Minn. 1992).
142. Rockwell Int? Corp., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
143. Imperial Corp. of Am. v. Shields, 167 F.R.D. 447,456 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
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versus insurer dispute.
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was named as a defendant in a number of environmental liability law-
suits .
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insurers and requested defense according to the provisions of the policies
outlining the insurers' duty to defend."
6 A  n u m b e r  
o f  
i n s u r e r s  
d e n i e d
the claim outright, whil  a number of other insurers agreed to defend un-
der a reservation of rights.
147 R o c k w e l l  
l a t e r  
s u e d  
i t s  
i n s u r
e r s  
f o
r  
d e c l
a r a -
tory relief and breach of contract!" During discovery, Rockwell with-
held certain documents from the insurers and claimed protection under
the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine."
9 The insurers urged the court to follow Waste Management, which
would require Rockwell to provide the documentation.
15° H o w e v e r ,  t h eCalifornia Court of Appeals rejected Waste Management and held that
(1) a cooperation clause does not act as a waiver of confidentiality and
(2) a common interest does not exist between an insured and an insurer
that has issued a reservation of rights.
151 In holding that a cooperation clause does not waive an expectation
of confidentiality, which is an element required to establish privilege, the
court conducted a three-part analysis.
152 F i r s t ,  t h e  
c o u r t  
l o o k e d  
a t  
t h e
plain language of the cooperation clause and held that there was no basis
to infer that the insured expected to waive the confidentiality of its attor-
ney's advice to satisfy the conditions of the policy .
153 T h e  p l a i n  
l a n -
guage merely addressed the insurer's right to attend hearings and trials
and made no reference to providing privileged or confidential informa-
t ion.
154 Second, the court concluded that the intent o f  the cooperation
clause was to prevent the insured and a potential plaintiff from colluding
against the insurer, not to compel the production of privileged informa-
t ion.
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nor did they intend to obtain, privileged information when they drafted
the policy provision.
156
144. Rockwell Intl  Corp., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
145. Id at 155.
146. Id
147. M
148. M
149. Id at 156.
150. Id
151.M at 160.
152. M at 156-58.
153. id. at 157.
154. M
155. See id. at 158.
156. Id
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Third, the court held that the Waste Management approach was in
conflict with California legislation that prevented the insurer from ob-
taining privileged information for use in a coverage dispute:
57 A d d r e s s -ing the situation where an insurer with the duty to defend had issued a
reservation of rights letter, Section 2860 of  the California Civ il Code
provides the following:
it shall be the duty of that counsel and the insured to disclose to the
insurer all information concerning the action except privileged ma-
terials relevant to coverage disputes. A n y  claim of privilege as-
serted is subject to in camera review in the s uper ior  court. Any
information disclosed by the insured or by independent counsel is
not a waiver of the privilege as to any other party.158
The court determined that the legislature intended to protect the at-
torney-client privilege for the insured to have an attorney relationship
"free from the fear of disclosure of privileged communications."
I59 T h ecourt believ d that the policy of transparent communication between at-
torneys and clients trumps the policy of transparent communication be-
tween insureds and insurers.
With respect to its second holding, the court concluded that a com-
mon interest did not exist between Rockwell and its insurers because the
common interest doctrine requires that two parties retain or consult the
same counsel regarding a common interest:
60 H o w e v e r ,  
t h i s  
r e a s o n i n g  
i s
flawed because the common interest doctrine and joint-defense doctrine
are distinct exceptions and must be considered separately.161 Unlike the
court in Waste Management, which focused on the common interest be-
tween the insurer and the insured, the California Court of Appeals fo-
cused on whether the insured and the insurer retained the same coun-
se1:
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of common interest. I t  only addressed the exclusion applicable to joint-
defense, which was not applicable under the circumstances because the
insurer and the insured were not co-parties in the litigation.
Applying the majority position, the Rockwell court held that when
an insurer is reimbursing defense costs and has reserved its right to later
deny coverage, a common interest does not exist between the insured and
157.M
158. Id (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(d) (italics in original)).
159. Id at 158.
160. M at 160.
161. See supra Part 11113 (explaining that the joint-defense doctrine applies when parties share
the same counsel, while the common interest doctrine applies when parties share a "common inter-
est" in a matter but retain different counsel).
162. Rockwell Intl  Corp., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160.
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the insurer.
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interest does not exist, it  focused its analysis on whether the insured
should be forced to share information with its insurer.' 64 The court failed
to consider the implications of its decision as relating to a situation in
which the interests of the insurer and the insured are aligned. Under the
Rockwell approach, anytime an insured voluntarily shares privileged in-
formation with an insurer that has issued a reservation of rights, a com-
mon interest does not exist and the privilege is waived with respect to all
other parties.
2. The Majority Approach Applied to Privileged Information that an
Insured Shares with its Dez0 Insurer
The Southern District of California had the opportunity to apply the
Rockwell majority approach to a third party discovery request within the
specific context of D&O insurance.
165 Y e t ,  
b e c a u s e  
t h e  
R o c k w e l l  
a p -
proach failed to address the common interest of the parties and applied
its holding only to the situation of a general liability insurer-insured dis-
pute, an inappropriate outcome resulted.
In Imperial Corp. o f  America v. Shields, the Southern District of
California was asked to determine the exact question of whether privi-
leged information shared with a D&O insurer was discoverable by a third
party plaintiff.
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the insurer had a common interest with the insured because both parties
opp sed the plaintiffs .
I67 T h e  
c o u r t  
h e l d  
t h a t  
t h e  
c o m m u
n i c a t i
o n s  
w e
r e
not protected by priv ilege.
168 I n  
r e a c h i n g  
i t s  
c o n c l u s i
o n ,  
t h e  
c o u
r t  
c o
n -
ceded that there was no federal case directly controlling this issue with
respect to D&O insurance.
I69 I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e  
c o u r t  
e x p r e s
s l y  
r e j e c
t e d  
t h
e
holding of Waste Management on the grounds that it was not binding and
ha  been rejected by a majority of courts.
1713 I n s t e a d ,  t h e  
c u r t  
r e l i d  
o n
federal case  that support the majority approach and concluded there was
o common interest when the insured and the insurer are in a coverage
dispute.
I71
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Imperial Corp. of Am. v. Shields, 167 F.R.D. 447, 450-51 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 451.
168. M
169. M
170. Id. at 452.
171. Id. at 451-52 (citing Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1514-15 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Vermont Gas Sys. v. U.S. Pict. & Guar. Co.,
151 F.R.D. 268, 277 (D. Vt. 1993); NL Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 144 F.R.D. 225,
231 (13./si.J. 1992)).
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The counsel, chosen by the defendant directors and officers, pro-
vided letters to the defendant's D&O insurer pursuant to the cooperation
clause of  the policy !" The letters contained detailed explanations of
counsel's investigation, analysis of the risk exposure, and descriptions of
a settlement demand!" Dur ing the time the letters were being for-
warded, counsel also entered into an agreement with the D&O insurer
that specifically provided that the "purpose of the agreement [was] to
share confidential information to facilitate defense of the claims in the
underlying action."
174 Even though the insured and the insurer agreed to share confidential
information only for the benefit of their mutual interest, the court held
that the attorney-client privilege was waived because the insurer did not
select the counsel, did not directly pay the counsel, did not seek legal
advice, and did not obtain the same counse1.
175 T h e  c o u r t  
p l a c e d  
m u c h  
o f
its emphasis on the fact that counsel and insured were aware that their
interests did not fully align with the insurer's interest because the insurer
had issued a reservation of rights letter.
176 Although the court did not specifically mention the common inter-
est doctrine with respect to the attorney-client privilege, it did expressly
review the doctrine with respect to the work product privilege!" Incor-
rectly referring to the common interest doctrine as the "joint defense pri-
vilege," the court distinguished between normal business communica-
tions and common defense strategies!" I t  found that the letters were
normal business communications because the letters were the method
that the insured and the attorneys used to comply with the provisions of
the policy, specifically the cooperation clause.'
9 The court expressed concern that i f  the common interest rule did
apply to communications between an insurer with no defense obligations
and an insured, then it would also apply to any other entity with which
the insured was in a contractual relationship.180 Because the insurer and
the insured did not have a common interest and the insurer was a poten-
tial adversary of the insured, the court held that the work product doc-
172. Id. at 450.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. M at 452-53.
176. M at 455-56.
177 .1d. at 455.
178. Id. at 455-56.
179. Id. at 455.
180. id. at 456.
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trine did not protect the communications between the insured's counsel
and the insurer."'
The result in Imperial is inappropriate because it rejects the policies
behind both the majority and minority approaches to the common interest
doctrine. Although the majority approach attempts to protect the insured
from being forced to share information, the insured in Imperial was
forced to share information with a third party plaintiff. I n  addition, the
insured in Imperial was discouraged from providing information to the
insurer, which directly conflicts with the policy of transparent communi-
cation between insureds and insurers.
However, the minority approach is also not appropriate because it
forces the insured to share information with its insurer even when their
interests are not aligned. T o achieve a more practical result, a third ap-
proach is necessary. This approach should recognize a limited common
interest in which the insured and the insurer have a common interest with
respect to the underlying litigation, but not with respect to coverage dis-
pute issues.
V. A LIMITED COMMON INTEREST EXISTS BETWEEN AN INSURED AND
AN INSURER THAT IS NOT DIRECTLY DEFENDING THE CLAIM
Courts should find that a limited common interest exists between a
D&O insurer and insured because finding that no common interest exists
fails to recognize that the insurer's and the insured's interests in the out-
come of  the litigation are aligned. The Eastern District of California
found a limited common interest between an insured and a general liabil-
ity insurer that was paying for Cumis counsel because it had the duty to
defend, but had issued a reservation of rights letter .
182 T h i s  P a r t  fi r s t  
d e -
scribes the decision of the Eastern District of California and then ex-
plains why a limited common interest should also apply to a situation
involving a D&O insurer that has the duty to reimburse defense costs.
A. A Limited Common Interest Exists Between an Insured
and an Insurer Paying for Cumis Counsel
In Lectrolarm Custom Systems, Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc., the Eastern
District of California examined whether a third party plaintiff was enti-
tled to information protected by privilege that was shared with the defen-
dant's general liability insurer.
183 T h e  
c o u r t  
f o u n d  
t h a t  
t h e  
p r i v i l e
g e  
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s
181./d.
182. Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 567, 570 (ED. Cal. 2002).
183. Id. at 568.
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not waived when the insured voluntarily provided information to its in-
surer that was paying for Cumis counsel.
In Lectrolarm, Pelco, the insured, was being sued by the plaintiff,
Lectrolarm, for unfair competition and trademark infringement.'" Pel-
co's insurer issued a reservation of rights letter, but was paying for Cu-
mis counsel because it had a duty to defend under the insurance policy.'
85Lectrolarm submitted a broad discovery request to Pelco and Pelco's li-
ability insurer.
186 T h e  
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tion be exchanged between the two parties.'"
The c urt held that Pelco could not be compelled to disclose the
privileged information to Lectrolarm because the discovery request was
too broad."
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unreasonable and "propounded for  the improper purpose o f  harass-
ment."
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been reasonable, Pelco had not waived any privilege by sharing informa-
tion with its insurer because Pelco and the insurer had a common inter-
190est.
In holding that the insured and insurer had a common interest, the
court analyzed whether a "common legal enterprise" existed when the
insurer was paying for Cumis counsel rather than defending the litigation
directly .
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tween the insured's interest and the insurer's interest because the insurer
had reserved its right to later deny coverage.
192 A s  s u c h ,  
t h e  i n s u r e d  
a n d
insurer would not have a common interest if they began to litigate against
one another to determine coverage.
193 H o w e v e r ,  
t h e  
o u r t  
f o u n d  
t h a t  
t h e
insured and the insurer did share a common legal enterprise with respect
t  communications relating to the claims and defenses in the underlying
lawsuit.'"
184. Id.
185. Id. at 570. The opinion did not expressly state that Pelco's insurer had the duty to defend.
However, the opinion does state that Pelco is entitled to Cumis counsel, which only applies when the
insurer has the duty to defend. See San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc.,
208 Cal. RIM% 494,498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
186. Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc., 212 F.R.D. at 568-69.
187.M
188. Id. at 570.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 572.
191.M.
192. Id at 571.
193. Id. at 572.
194. Id
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The court in Lectrolarm placed significant weight on Section 2860
of the California Civil Code.
195 S e c t i o n  
2 8 6 0  
s t a t e s  
t h a t  
" [ a ]
n y  
i n f o r
m a -
tion disclosed [to the insurer] b y  independent counsel is not a waiver
of the privilege as to any other party ."
196 H o w e v e r ,  
S e c t i o n  
2 8 6 0  
w a s  
n o t
controlling because f deral law, rather than state law, applied.
197 N e v e r -theless, the court applied Section 2860 because the insured relied on it
when deciding to share information with its insurer.
198 Although the court in Lectrolarm denied the discovery request be-
cause it  was too broad, the court still decided to address the issue of
whether a common interest existed because it was confident that such an
issue would arise again.
I99 U n l i k e  
t h e  
c o u r t s  
i n  
R o c k
w e l l  
o
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I m p e
r i a l
,
this court concluded that a limited common interest did ex is t.
2m A l -though the Lectrolarm decision was based upon the context of a general
liability insurer that did have the duty to defend, it is also applicable to a
D&O insurer that does not have the duty to defend.
B. A Limited Common Interest Should Also Exist
Between an Insured and a D&O Insurer
Although the insurer had the duty to defend in Lectrolarm, the
court's reasoning should also extend to circumstances when an insurer,
such as a D&O insurer, has the duty to reimburse defense costs rather
than the duty to defend. The insured in Lectrolarm appointed a Cumis
counsel because the insurer had issued a reservation of rights letter .
201Therefore, similar to D&O insurance, the insured in Lectrolam, not the
insurer, had control of the defense. There are few, i f  any, differences
between the relationship and interest that an insurer has with Cumis
counsel and the relationship the insurer has with counsel appointed by
the insured under a D&O policy.
The limited common interest rule illustrated by the court in Lec-
trolarm should also be applied to the context of an insured sharing in-
formation with its D&O insurer because the limited common interest (1)
correctly rejects the application of the cooperation clause taken by the
court in Waste Management; (2) recognizes the distinction between the
joint-defense doctrine and the common interest doctrine; and (3) draws a
195. Id at 571.
196. CAL. CIV. CODE * 2860(d).
197. Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc., 212 F.R.D. at 570.
198. Id at 570-71.
199. Id. at 571.
200. Id at 572.
201. M  at 570.
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distinction between interests in which the insured and the insurer are
aligned and those interests in which the parties are adversaries.
First, even though the court in Lectrolarm did not expressly reject
Waste Management, the court did recognize that the insured expected its
communications with its insurer to remain confidential with respect to
third parties.
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the insurer waived an expectation of  confidentiality because to do so
would put the insured in the position of choosing between sharing confi-
dential information with the insurer and obtaining reimbursement for
defense.
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legal defense. The court was also in line with the majority of other juris-
dictions that have failed to adopt the court's approach in Waste Man-
agement waiving confidentiality under the cooperation clause.
Second, a number of jurisdictions that have rejected the court's
finding in Waste Management of a per se common interest between the
insurer and the insured have done so by incorrectly interpreting the
common interest doctrine.
204 I n  
t h e s e  
c a s e s ,  
t h e  
c o u r t
s  
h a v
e  
c o n s i
d e r e d
only whether the same counsel represents the insurer and insured, rather
han whether the insurer and the insured have an actual common interest.
By dopting a common interest doctrine that applies only when parties
share the same counsel, the attorney-client privilege would not be pro-
tected in many situations when the parties have a common interes t
mFor example, under a shareholder derivative action, many directors or
officers might want to retain independent counsel to avoid any conflict-
ing defense. However, if  the common interest doctrine is limited only to
parties sharing counsel, the counsel representing the different defendant
irectors would not be able to transparently communicate. Not  permit-
ting the common interest doctrine to apply when parties have separate
counsel, but do have a common interest, would greatly impede the effi-
ciency of the legal process and possibly impact the outcome of the litiga-
tion, despite the underlying merits of the case. Therefore, the court in
Lectrolarm appropriately analyzed the interest of the parties rather than
the procedural structure of their defense.
Third, instead of making a bright line determination that an insurer
is an adversary of an insured or that an insurer is completely aligned with
an insured, the court in Lectrolarm determined the interest based upon
202. id. at 570-71.
203. Id. at 571.
204. Inel Ins. Co. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 800 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (find-
ing no common interest because parties did not share the same counsel); N. River Ins. Co. v. Phila.
Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 367 (3.N.J. 1992); Rockwell Inel Corp. v. Superior Court, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
205. See Fischer, supra note 97, at 657.
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the underlying s ituation.
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law, holding that a common interest only applies when there is no dis-
pute about coverage.
207 
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and an insured would never have a common interest in the litigation until
after settlement or final adjudication by the court because the status of
coverage often turns on the adjudicated issues. I n  Lectrolarm, the court
correctly concluded that the insured and insurer have a common interest
in the underlying litigation, but might not have a common interest in oth-
er matters.
208 This holding also makes sense under a pragmatic approach for two
reasons. First, most relationships are not the same under every situation.
It is quite possible for parties to be co-litigants in one action and be op-
posing parties in a subsequent action involving similar subject matter.
For instance, a third party might be suing a corporation and one of its
agents for breach of contract while the corporation is suing its agent for
negligence, each involving the same set of facts but different legal theo-
ries. I f  a bright line approach was adopted, an absurd result would occur.
Either the corporation and the agent could not share privileged informa-
tion about the contractual liability claim or the corporation and the agent
would be forced to share privileged information regarding the negligence
claim. However, under the Lectrolarm approach, the corporation and
agent can freely communicate with respect to the contractual claim, but
their distinct legal strategies and communications pertaining to the negli-
gence claim remain protected. The middle ground approach promotes
efficient litigation when the insured's and the insurer's interests are
aligned, and it  simultaneously protects their adversarial position when
their interests are opposed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Insureds are familiar with general liability insurance because they
utilize it in a variety of situations. Most insureds are not as familiar with
D8c0 insurance because it is tailored to apply to limited instances of cor-
porate malpractice. Furthermore, many insureds wrongly assume that
IMOD insurance and general liability insurance work in the same way.
However, a D&O insurance policy is much more complex than the tradi-
206. Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc., 212 F.R.D. at 572.
207. Imperial Corp. of Am. v. Shields, 167 F.R.D. 447, 452 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Vermont
Gas Sys. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 151 F.R.D. 268, 277 (D. Vt. 1993) ("The 'common interest'
doctrine does not apply where there is an adversarial relationship between the insured and insurer as
to whether coverage exists.") and NL Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 144 F.R.D. 225,
231 (D.N.J. 1992) ("The common interest doctrine is applicable only when it has been determined
that the i ns ur er  is obligated to defend the underlying action brought against the insured.")).
208. Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc., 212 F.R.D. at 572.
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tional general liability insurance policy. As  such, severe consequences
occur when the unique aspects of D&O insurance policies are not fully
considered or understood.
An insured might believe that it can share privileged information
with its D&O insurer without waiving the privilege because it can usu-
ally do so with its general liability insurer.
209 H o w e v e r ,  
a n  i n s u r e d  
t h a t
does share privileged information with its D8c0 insurer jeopardizes the
protection offered u der the attorney-client privilege and the work prod-
uct doctrine. Although privileged information shared with a general li-
ability insurer is usually protected under the joint-defense or common
interest doctrine, most jurisdictions will likely hold that information
shared with a D8c0 insurer is not.
M O  insurers and their insureds are not protected under the joint-
defense doctrine because they do not share the same counsel. The major-
ity of jurisdictions will also hold that D&O insurers and insureds are not
protected under the common interest doctrine because the insurers do not
have the duty to defend and have issued a reservation of rights letter.
With no duty to defend, the insurer does not have a legal interest in the
outcome of the litigation. The majority of jurisdictions currently hold
that only a legal interest creates a common interest; a mere financial in-
terest, no matter how significant, is not enough. In  addition, because the
insurer has issued a reservation of rights letter, the two parties might be
adversaries in future coverage litigation.
It is inappropriate for the majority to hold that a common interest
does not exist between an insured and insurer when the insurer does not
have a duty to defend and has issued a reservation of rights letter. In-
stead, a limited common interest does exist between the two parties. A
common interest applies only to information about the litigation in which
the insurer is advancing defense costs and does not apply to coverage
disputes.
A limited common interest would encourage the insured to continue
to openly communicate with its D&O insurer. Open communication is
important because it prevents possible fraud and prevents possible future
litigation by fostering a cooperative relationship between a D&O insurer
and its insureds. Although the D&O insurer's interest is financial and not
legal, it is directly related to the outcome of the litigation. However, a
limited common interest also recognizes that the insured and D&O in-
209. An insured can share information with its general liability insurer without jeopardizing
privilege, so long as the insurer has accepted coverage for the claim. A  general liability insurer
accepts coverage for claims more than it issues reservation of rights letters. I t  is also unlikely that an
insured would voluntarily share privileged information with an insurer that has expressly denied
coverage (doing so would waive any associated privilege).
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surer might be future adversaries. Therefore, if  the insured chooses not to
share information with its D&O insurer, it will not be forced to do so in
future litigation.
